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Switzerland
THE STATE OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
Johannes Reich, Professor of Public Law, Environmental Law, and Energy Law – 
University of Zurich
SWITZERLAND
I. INTRODUCTION
Roughly every second referendum held 
worldwide at the national level takes place 
in Switzerland,1  turning voting into nothing 
short of “a way of life.”2  All amendments 
to the Federal Constitution of the Swiss 
Confederation (Fed Const)3  are subject to a 
referendum. Constitutional law is therefore 
as least as much shaped by “the People” as 
it is by courts, Parliament, or the executive 
branch. This is all the more true in view of 
the Federal Constitution identifying Feder-
al Parliament rather than the courts as “the 
supreme authority”4  of Switzerland as a 
federal republic, being a “confederation” in 
DOOEXW LWVRI¿FLDOQDPH&RXUWVDQGDGPLQ-
istrative agencies are consequently bound to 
apply both federal statutes and international 
treaties, both enacted by Federal Parliament, 
HYHQZKHQVXFKSURYLVLRQVFRQÀLFWZLWKWKH
Federal Constitution.5  As a result of both 
frequent referenda and weak judicial review, 
federal constitutional law has for all its exis-
tence since 1848 been deeply embedded in 
politics. Rather than being “an anchor” or 
“a rock to hold on to,”6  the Federal Consti-
tution forms not only an object of constant 
public discourse but also of the politics of 
the day. To this effect, the Federal Constitu-
tion of the Swiss Confederation may be aptly 
characterised as a “popular constitution” em-
1 Uwe Serdült, ‘Referendums in Switzerland’ in Matt Qvortrup (ed), Referendums Around the World:
The Continued Growth of Direct Democracy (Palgrave Macmillan 2014) 65–121, 68.
2 ‘Voting as a way of life’, The Economist (London, 12 February 2004) 6.
3-LKLYHS*VUZ[P[\[PVUVM[OL:^PZZ*VUMLKLYH[PVUVM(WYPS   B\UVɉJPHS,UNSPZO[YHUZSH[PVUH]HPS-
HISLH[#^^ ^HKTPUJOVWJLUJSHZZPÄLKJVTWPSH[PVU    PUKL_O[TS%HJJLZZLK-LIY\HY`
2018].
4 Fed Const, art 148 cl 1.
5 Fed Const, art 190.
6 Justice Antonin Scalia (referring to the United States Constitution), in an interview conducted by Dan 
Izenberg, ‘Clinging to the Constitution’ Jerusalem Post (Jerusalem, 19 February 1990) 5.
bodying elements not only of liberal but also 
of “radical democracy.” One would probably 
expect that such a “popular constitution” 
would readily fall prey to the wave of pop-
ulism that caught some liberal democracies 
in recent years. Yet, developments in Swiss 
constitutional law, tracing back to 1848 and 
beyond, paint a more nuanced and richer 
picture. They point to the fact that the equi-
librium between popular sovereignty and 
individual liberty demands, within certain 
limits, constant deliberation and re-balanc-
ing. Swiss constitutional law thus attests to 
the French proverb according to which it is 
only the temporary arrangements that last (Il 
n’y a que le provisoire qui dure).
II. LIBERAL DEMOCRACY ON
THE RISE OR DECLINE?
Liberal and Radical Democracy
“Liberal democracy” is a concept aiming to 
reconcile the “rule by the people” (“democ-
racy”) with individual liberty through con-
stitutional institutions such as limited gov-
ernment, separation of powers, and the rule 
of law. Individual freedom in a liberal de-
mocracy is primarily conceived of as nega-
tive freedom, i.e., freedom from government 
intervention. Alluding to Abraham Lincoln’s 
Gettysburg Address, liberal democracy thus 
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tends to emphasise government “for” rather 
than “of” or “by” the people.7  The modern 
idea of liberal democracy is rooted in the 
writings of philosophers such as John Locke, 
Montesquieu, or Immanuel Kant. A liberal 
democracy particularly emphasising safe-
guards against oppressing majority rule is, 
with reference to James Madison’s remarks 
in The Federalist No 10, sometimes called a 
“Madisonian Democracy.”8  Liberal democ-
racy is distinguishable from “radical democ-
racy.”  This rather elusive term captures an 
understanding of democracy aiming at the 
highest possible degree of equal, direct, and 
broad participation of the citizens of a polity 
by way of constitutional arrangements such 
as extended electoral rights, referenda, and 
popular initiatives (direct democracy). Rad-
ical democracy hence emphasises self-rule – 
in short, government “of” and “by” the peo-
ple. The notion of “radical democracy”9 is 
most notably associated with the ideas of the 
Geneva-born Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
The Federal Court Policing the Democratic 
Process at the Canton Level
The Swiss Federal Constitution combines 
elements of both liberal and radical de-
mocracy. The bill of rights enshrined in the 
Constitution and the separation of powers 
between the bicameral Federal Parliament 
(“Federal Assembly”; legislative branch); 
the multi-party collegiate Federal Council 
consisting of seven members with equal 
rights and responsibilities elected by par-
liament for a term of four years (executive 
branch); and the Federal Court,10 being the 
highest judicial authority of the Federation, 
all rank among the constitutional compo-
7 See Abraham Lincoln, ‘Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at Gettysburg’ (19 November 1863) in: Roy P. Basler (ed), Collected Works of
Abraham Lincoln (New Brunswick 1953) 17–23.
8 Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (University of Chicago Press 1956) 4–33.
9 For a contrasting juxtaposition of liberal and radical democracy see, e.g., Marc Bühlmann, Adrian Vatter, Oliver Dlabac, and Hans-Peter Schaub, ‘Liberal 
and Radical Democracies: The Swiss Cantons Compared’ (2014) 10 World Political Science Review 385, 391–396.
10 All opinions of the Federal Court are available free of charge in their respective original language (German, French, Italian, Romansch) at <www.bger.ch> 
accessed 28 February 2018.
11 The above cited were famously coined in the context of United States Constitutional Law by John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (Harvard University 
Press 1980) 73, 88.
12 See Fed Const, art 39 cl 1.
13 BGE 143 I 92 para. 6.4 (decided on 12 October 2016; published in 2017).
14 See, e.g., BGE 75 I 244.
15 BGE 143 I 78 (decided on 14 December 2016; published in 2017).
nents of liberal democracy. The Federal 
Court in fact constitutes the federal supreme 
court but owes its modest and slightly mis-
leading name to the fact that it formed the 
only federal court at the time of its estab-
lishment as a permanent court in 1874. The 
Federal Court is not a special constitutional 
court operating separately from the ordinary 
courts, but decides cases and controversies 
pertaining to civil, criminal, administrative, 
and constitutional law. Its authority is, as 
noted above, severely limited with regard to 
both federal and international law, but not 
to the laws and regulations of the Cantons, 
the component states of Switzerland. One of 
the Federal Court’s core functions, therefore, 
extends to “policing” the democratic process 
in the Cantons by applying what, alluding to 
John Hart Ely, may be called a “participa-
tion-oriented” and “representation-reinforc-
ing” approach to judicial review.11 
In its judgments either published or decided 
in 2017, the Federal Court applied this ap-
proach in a rather bold fashion as its case law 
regarding voting systems at the Canton level 
illustrates. Whereas Switzerland’s 26 Can-
tons are all bound to elect their parliaments 
directly by the people, the Federal Constitu-
tion fails to explicitly specify whether such 
elections are to be held on the basis of pro-
portional representation or majority voting. 
Rather, the Federal Constitution provides 
that it is for each Canton to decide how the 
political rights within the respective polity 
are being exercised.12  Still, the Federal Court 
has severely limited the Canton’s autonomy 
in this regard on the ground of the Federal 
Constitution’s guarantee to each citizen to 
equal treatment in a string of decisions since 
2014. This case law sheds light on the fact 
that, under the condition of majority voting, 
a considerable portion of votes fails to exert 
DQ\LQÀXHQFHRQWKHRXWFRPHRIDQHOHFWLRQ
at all. Votes cast either for the losing can-
didate or for the winning candidate beyond 
the required threshold (“excess votes”) are 
virtually “wasted.” When proportional rep-
resentation applies, in contrast, many more 
votes carry weight with regard to the actual 
outcome of an election. On these grounds, 
the Federal Court, in a decision published in 
2017, reinforced its position that a Canton is 
under a constitutional obligation to provide 
compelling reasons, such as limited rele-
vance of political parties within a polity or a 
comparatively low number of voters residing 
in a given voting district, to constitutionally 
cling to a majority voting or a mixed voting 
system.13,QWHUYHQWLRQE\RI¿FLDOVLQUHIHUHQ-
dum campaigns provide yet another example 
of said “participation-oriented” and “repre-
sentation-reinforcing” approaches to judicial 
review as applied by the Federal Court. Re-
DI¿UPLQJ D VWDWHPHQW KDYLQJ IRUPHG SDUW
of its case law since at least eight decades, 
according to which “no result of a vote may 
EHDSSURYHGIDLOLQJWRUHÀHFWWKHIUHHDQGXQ-
biased will of the voters,”14  authorities may, 
according to the Court’s judgment published 
2017, provide the voters with their own as-
sessment of a proposal put to vote in a Can-
ton or municipality different from the respec-
tive authority as long as such a statement is 
not only drafted in an objective and unbiased 
manner but the polity, of which said authori-
ty forms part, is “affected” by the outcome of 
the vote in question.15 
Consociational Democracy and Its Moder-
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ating Effects under Distress
Democracy as founded on the Swiss Feder-
al Constitution is, however, a far cry from a 
“Madisonian Democracy.” Rather, the ideals 
of radical democracy have left their lasting 
marks on federal constitutional law of which 
the popular initiative is the prime example. 
Said instrument allows a committee of 7 to 
27 citizens to put a proposal of a constitu-
tional amendment in unaltered form to a 
popular vote, provided that 100,000 citizens, 
whose signatures must be collected within 
18 months, are backing said draft. Popular 
initiatives may therefore pursue radical and 
rather utopian objectives such as the abo-
lition of the Swiss Army in 1989 and 2001 
or, more recently in 2016, the introduction 
of a nation-wide universal basic income. The 
Federal Constitution fails to erect any barrier 
as to the content of such a proposal other than 
the “peremptory norms of international law” 
(ius cogens) consisting of such basic norms 
as the prohibition of genocide, torture, slav-
ery or inhuman and degrading treatment.16 
As all popular initiatives are channelled 
through the system of representative democ-
racy, providing both the Federal Council 
(executive branch) and the Federal Assem-
bly (legislative branch) with an opportunity 
not only to recommend the voters to either 
back or reject the proposal but to initiate a 
counter-proposal diminishing the chances 
for the popular initiative to be successful at 
the ballot box, almost all proposals severely 
restricting minority rights have been rejected 
since popular initiatives were introduced at 
the federal level in 1891.17  Just as all oth-
er amendments to the Federal Constitution, 
16-VYHTVYLKL[HPSLKHZZLZZTLU[ZLL[OL,UNSPZOZ\TTHY`VM1VOHUULZ9LPJOº+PYLR[L+LTVRYH[PL\UK]SRLYYLJO[SPJOL=LYWÅPJO[\UNLUPT2VUÅPR[B+PYLJ[
+LTVJYHJ`HUK6ISPNH[PVUZ:[LTTPUNMYVT7\ISPJ0U[LYUH[PVUHS3H^PU*VUÅPJ[D»BDALP[ZJOYPM[MYH\ZSpUKPZJOLZɈLU[SPJOLZ9LJO[\UK=SRLYYLJO[
[Heidelberg Journal of International Law] 979, 1024–25.
17 Johannes Reich, ‘An Interactional Model of Direct Democracy: Lessons from the Swiss Experience’ (SSRN, 23 July 2008) <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/
ssrn.1154019> accessed 23 February 2018.
18 Bernhard Degen, ‘Initiative populaire’ (Dictionnaire historique de la Suisse, 18 July 2016) <http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/f/F10386.php> accessed 23 
February 2018.
19 See Friedrich Külling, ‘L‘abattage rituel’ (Dictionnaire historique de la Suisse, 2 September 2008) <http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/f/F11380.php> ac-
cessed 23 February 2018.
20 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, IU[LYUH[PVUHS4PNYH[PVU6\[SVVR (41st edn, OECD Publishing 2017) 297 (referring to 2015) 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/migr_outlook-2017-en> accessed 28 February 2018.
21;OL[OLVY`VMJVUZVJPH[PVUHSKLTVJYHJ`^HZÄYZ[HUKMVYLTVZ[KL]LSVWLKI`(YLUK3PQWOHY["MVYHUV]LY]PL^ZLL9\K`)(UKL^LNº*VUZVJPH[PVUHS
democracy’ (2000) 3 Annual Review of Political Science 509.
22 See Adrian Vatter, Das politische System der Schweiz (2nd edn, Nomos 2016) 351–2. 
23:LLVU[OLÄYZ[HUK[OL[OPYKVM[OLHIV]LTLU[PVULKPUP[PH[P]LZ+HUPLS4VLJRSPº6M4PUHYL[ZHUK-VYLPNU*YPTPUHSZ!:^PZZ+PYLJ[+LTVJYHJ`HUK/\THU
Rights’ (2011) 11(4) Human Rights Law Review 774.
popular initiatives require a cumulative ma-
jority of both the voters and the 26 Cantons 
in order to be approved. The result of the 
popular vote in each Canton determines its 
respective vote. Of all the 238 popular initia-
tives put to a popular vote between 1891 and 
1999, a mere 12 (or 5 percent) were success-
ful;18WKHYHU\¿UVWSRSXODULQLWLDWLYHHYHUSXW
to a federal vote on 20 August 1893 – the ban 
of kosher butchering, largely motivated by 
anti-Semitic prejudice – being the only pop-
ular initiative approved by both the voters 
and the Cantons, unambiguously infringing 
on minority rights during this era.19 
The very low success rate of popular initia-
tives over more than a century was largely 
due to a process of political decision-making 
called “consociational democracy,” which 
has been of crucial importance for Swit-
zerland as a multilingual and multidenom-
inational country with a permanent resident 
population of whom 29.1 percent are for-
eign born.20  Consociational democracy con-
sists of elements such as consensual pow-
er sharing, broad participation of minority 
groups, elite cooperation, and gradual inclu-
sion of opposition parties into the executive 
branch.21  Said composition of the executive 
branch (Federal Council) is the prime exam-
ple of consociational democracy. The Fed-
eral Council is composed of seven members 
with equal rights and responsibilities, who 
VLQFH  KDYH EHORQJHG WR ¿YH GLIIHUHQW
parties and currently originate from the Ger-
man, French, and Italian-speaking regions 
of Switzerland. The moderating effect of 
consociational democracy on radical de-
mocracy has been in sharp decline since the 
early 1990s, however, due to increased po-
larization of the political landscape. Key po-
litical issues such as immigration and Swit-
zerland’s relation to the European Union 
(EU) spurred divergence among political 
parties to levels barely known since the end 
of the Second World War, from which the 
country was spared. Whereas Switzerland 
is, unlike all of its neighbouring states, nei-
ther a member of the EU nor the European 
Economic Area, it is closely connected with 
the EU by a densely knit network of bilat-
eral treaties. The demise of consociational 
democracy and its moderating effect on rad-
ical democracy is underscored by the fact 
that around 20 percent of the popular initia-
tives put to a popular vote between 2004 and 
2013 were approved.22 Among these consti-
tutional amendments passed were a ban on 
the construction of minarets, a constitution-
al amendment limiting “mass immigration,” 
and, in 2010, a requirement to readily expel 
foreign criminals.23  Still, a popular initia-
tive aimed at an enforcement mechanism for 
the last-mentioned obligation without judi-
cial review was rejected in a popular vote 
in 2016.
In contrast to the federal level, similar pro-
posals equally infringing minority rights but 
launched in the Cantons are appealable with 
the Federal Court. The Federal Court’s inval-
idation of such a sub-federal popular initia-
tive seeking to frustrate the formation of a 
theological education institution for imams 
at the University of Fribourg, a state run 
university with a Roman-Catholic faculty of 
theology, on account of the Federal Consti-
tution’s prohibition of discrimination on the 
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grounds of religion in 2017,24  illustrates the 
different regimes in place at the various lev-
els of governance.
The European Convention of Human Rights 
as a Contested Additional Constitutional 
Layer
Still, in a controversial obiter dictum of 12 
October 2012, the Federal Court, given the 
constitutional obligation committing all 
courts to adhere to international law even 
ZKHQ WKH ODWWHU FRQÀLFWVZLWK WKH&RQVWLWX-
tion,25  foreshadowed the possibility of what 
could be coined “concrete (para-)constitu-
tional review” of provisions of the Federal 
Constitution on the basis of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), rati-
¿HGE\6ZLW]HUODQGLQ$VWKH(XURSHDQ
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) monitors 
Switzerland’s compliance with the ECHR 
unhinged by a clause limiting the scope of 
its review similar to article 190 Fed Const, 
the Federal Court has taken the view since 
1999 that both the ECHR and other interna-
tional human rights treaties take precedent 
over Federal Statutes.26  In the aforemen-
tioned controversial obiter dictum of 2012, 
the Court, or rather its second public law di-
vision, went a step further and declared that 
the ECHR would even precede norms of the 
Federal Constitution itself.27  Such a move 
would effectively transform the ECHR into 
an additional (supra-)constitutional layer 
above the actual domestic constitution.
Said obiter dictum produced a considerable 
SROLWLFDO EDFNODVK FXOPLQDWLQJ LQ WKH ¿OLQJ
of yet another popular initiative referred 
to as “Swiss Law instead of Foreign Judg-
es (Self-determination Initiative)” with the 
Federal Chancellery in 2016, seeking to en-
act a constitutional amendment according to 
24 BGE 143 I 129 (decided on 14 December 2016; published in 2017).
25 Fed Const, art 190.
26 See the respective leading case BGE 125 II 417 para 4 (26 July 1999).
27 BGE 139 I 16 para 5 (12 October 2012).
28 See Robert Dahl, Polyarchy (Yale University Press 1971) 53.
29 See Swiss Code of Obligations (Schweizerisches Obligationenrecht), art. 828 sect. 1.
30-LKLYHS:[H[PZ[PJHS6ɉJLº:[H[PZ[PJHS+H[HVU:^P[aLYSHUK»-LKLYHS:[H[PZ[PJHS6ɉJL#O[[WZ!^^ ^IMZHKTPUJOIMZZ[H[PJKHTHZ-
sets/2040009/master> accessed on 28 February 2018.
31 Dahl (n 29) 202-7; Robert Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (Yale University Press 1989) 233.
which the Federal Constitution, at least in 
principal, takes precedent over any other law 
with the exception of peremptory norms of 
international law (ius cogens). The respec-
tive popular vote is unlikely to take place 
before 2019. The Federal Council, on 5 July 
2017, formally recommended rejecting said 
“Self-determination Initiative.” Federal Par-
liament is expected to decide on its recom-
mendation in the course of 2018.
Frail Legitimacy of Switzerland’s “Cooper-
ative democracy”
Consociational democracy has for about a 
century provided not only for equilibrium 
between two competing concepts of democ-
racies but also for considerable protection for 
those minority groups who actively partici-
pate in the bargaining process of political de-
cision-making. The demise of consociational 
democracy since the 1990s and the lack of 
reliable enforceable protection against an 
overreaching majority provided by the Con-
stitution cast a light on the fragile legitimacy 
of Switzerland’s democracy with regard to 
its “cooperative,” club-like trait. These char-
acteristics trace back to the governance of 
some late-medieval free farmer societies and 
towns in many of today’s Cantons that bore 
some resemblance to today’s cooperatives,28 
i.e., entities established according to the
principles of self-government and self-ad-
ministration whose members join together 
in order to promote and safeguard common 
interests by way of collective self-help.29 
Many municipalities still take their decisions 
on citizenship applications of foreign resi-
dents seeking Swiss citizenship at town hall 
meetings after a deliberation by a show of 
hands. Any cooperation, however, inevita-
bly rests on a distinction between members 
DQGQRQPHPEHUV7KLVUDLVHVGLI¿FXOWPRUDO
questions as soon as some of the decisions 
taken by members extend to non-members, 
as Swiss democracy illustrates. 24.6 percent 
of the country’s permanent residents are, af-
ter all, non-Swiss citizens.30  Political rights 
at the federal level are, however, restricted 
to Swiss citizens over the age of 18. Judged 
against the normative premise according to 
which equality forms the bedrock of democ-
racy,31  the cooperative trait of Swiss democ-
UDF\UDLVHVLQFUHDVLQJO\GLI¿FXOWTXHVWLRQVDV
to its legitimacy.
Conclusion: In Search of New Equilibrium 
between Liberal and Radical Democracy
The ongoing debate on the scope of judi-
cial review and the status of international 
law bring the tensions between liberal and 
radical democracy inherent in the Federal 
Constitution to light. The system of consoci-
ational democracy providing for equilibrium 
between liberal and radical democracy has 
been in demise for almost two decades. The 
fragile legitimacy of Swiss democracy with 
regard to its considerable foreign population 
has become more visible as a result. In view 
of both the demand of the EU to put the close 
mutual relations on the more solid legal foot-
ing of a “framework agreement” and popular 
initiatives such as the “Self-determination 
Initiative,” the remaining years of the second 
decade of the current century are likely to 
mark a critical juncture for whether liberal 
or radical democracy prevails.
III. MAJOR CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENTS
Amendments to the Swiss Federal Consti-
tution
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In 2017, Swiss citizens were called upon to 
decide on four constitutional amendments.32 
Two amendments were endorsed on 12 Feb-
ruary 2017, one facilitating the naturalization 
of third-generation immigrants, the other re-
forming the funding-scheme of transport in-
frastructure. A largely symbolic constitution-
al amendment on nutrition security found a 
majority in the popular vote on 24 Septem-
ber 2017, whereas a constitutional provision 
UDLVLQJWKH9$7UDWHIRUWKHEHQH¿WRIWKHROG
age pension insurance was rejected.
Federal Court
The “chilling effect” doctrine as originally 
developed by the U.S. Supreme Court with 
regard to free speech provides for a recur-
rent topic in comparative constitutional law. 
Against this backdrop and by way of abstract 
constitutional review, the Federal Court held 
a newly enacted statute of a Canton in con-
formity with both freedom of expression and 
freedom of assembly as guaranteed by the 
Federal Constitution. Said statute holds that 
both promoters and violent participants of 
political rallies causing violence or damage 
to property would be liable up to an amount 
of CHF 30,000 (ca USD 30,000; EUR 
26,000) in the event that the rally in question 
was either conducted unauthorized or the 
promoters deliberately failed to comply with 
the terms of the permission granted by the 
local authorities. The Court in its majority 
was of the opinion that the “chilling effects” 
of the provision was limited as promoters 
and participants of political rallies could take 
precautionary measures in order to avoid any 
liability at all.33 
32 See Chancellerie fédérale [Federal Chancellery], ‘Répertoire chronologique 2011-2018’ (1°Feburary 2018) <https://www.bk.admin.ch/ch/f/pore/va/
vab_2_2_4_1_2011_2020.html> accessed 28 February 2018.
33 BGE 143 I 147 para 5.4 (18 January 2017).
34 BGE 143 I 211 (30 March 2017).
35 Federal Court, Judgement 1B_176/2016 para 8.2 (11 April 2017).
36 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, International Migration Outlook 2017 (41st edn, OECD Publishing 2017) 297 (referring to 
2015) [<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/migr_outlook-2017-en>].
37-LKLYHS:[H[PZ[PJHS6ɉJLº3LYULUKL!)HZPZ[HILSSL»-LKLYHS:[H[PZ[PJHS6ɉJL#O[[WZ!^^ ^IMZHKTPUJOIMZZ[H[PJKHTHZZL[Z
master> accessed 28 February 2018 .
38 See Johannes Reich, ‘Switzerland: Freedom of Creed and Conscience, Immigration and Public Schools in the Postsecular State: Compulsory Coeduca-
tional Swimming Instruction Revisited’ (2009) 7 International Journal of Constitutional Law 754–767.
39 6ZTHUVȘS\HUK2VJHIHȴ]:^P[aLYSHUK ECHR 2017/6ZTHUVȘS\HUK2VJHIHȴ]:^P[aLYSHUK App no 29086/12 (ECtHR, 10 January 2017). [EGMR, Os-
THUVȘS\L[2VJHIHȴJ:\PZZL9LX\v[LUV QHU]PLYD
40 BGer, 2C_666/2011 (7 March 2012); the leading case being BGE 135 I 79 (25 October 2008).
In many of Switzerland’s Cantons, judges 
RIRUGLQDU\FRXUWVRI¿UVWLQVWDQFHDUHRIWHQ
elected by the people with a limited term of 
RI¿FH XVXDOO\ IRXU RU VL[ \HDUV 3HULRGLF
re-elections of judges raise questions of ju-
dicial independence. Balancing sovereignty 
of the people and judicial independence, the 
Federal Court held a provision of a Canton, 
according to which new candidates may only 
stand for election as president of a court of 
¿UVW LQVWDQFH DW WKH¿UVW EDOORW LQ WKH HYHQW
of the incumbent president stepping down, 
to be constitutional.34 
Constitutional guarantees of human digni-
ty are often perceived as protecting against 
blatant infringements of individual liberty 
only. Contrasting such conceptions, the Fed-
eral Court held that calling a person by his or 
KHU¿UVW LQVWHDGRIKLV ODVWQDPHGXULQJD
VWRSDQGVHDUFKSURFHGXUHE\DSROLFHRI¿FHU
degrades the person in question to ‘a mere 
object of the procedure’ and may therefore, 
based on the concrete circumstances, amount 
to an infringement of said person’s human 
dignity.35  According to the Federal Court, it 
is therefore not the quantity but the quality 
of an infringement that matters when a vi-
olation of human dignity is to be assessed. 
Whether or not it is sensible to equate a mere 
lack of respect between decent human be-
ings – with a violation of human dignity the 
most basic human right there is – seems open 
to question, however.
European Court of Human Rights
Whereas 29.1 percent of Switzerland’s per-
manent resident population is foreign born, 
36 more than 93 percent of all students attend 
VWDWHUXQ LQVWLWXWLRQV LQRUGHU WR IXO¿OO WKHLU
compulsory schooling years.37  As Swiss 
constitutional law requires state schools to 
be neutral in matters of religion, accommo-
dating students’ religious beliefs and prac-
tices has been a focal point of constitutional 
law for more than a decade.38  The ECtHR in 
its judgment in the case of 2VPDQR÷OXDQG
.RFDEDú Y 6ZLW]HUODQG, dated 10 January 
2017, held that the school authorities of the 
Canton Basel-City acted in conformity with 
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion 
of two parents of Turkish origin and Muslim 
IDLWKZKHQ¿QLQJWKHODWWHU&+)DERXW
USD 620 at the time) each for refusing their 
two daughters (7 and 11 years of age, respec-
tively) to attend mandatory mixed-gender 
swimming instruction as part of the regular 
curriculum at their local state school on ac-
count of their religious beliefs.39  The Court 
WKHUHZLWK FRQ¿UPHG WKH DVVHVVPHQW RI WKH
case by the Federal Court.40 
IV. LOOKING AHEAD TO 2018
The Swiss Federal Constitution currently 
limits the powers of the Federation to levy 
direct federal tax and VAT until 2020. A con-
stitutional amendment prolonging this time 
limit until 2035 will be put to a popular vote 
on 4 March 2018. On the same date, Swiss 
citizens will be called upon to decide on a 
popular initiative seeking to completely pri-
vatize public service broadcasting by ren-
dering federal subsidies in favour of TV and 
radio stations unconstitutional. On 10 June 
2018, a popular vote will be held on a highly 
technical but radical constitutional amend-
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ment seeking to fundamentally modify Swit-
]HUODQG¶V PRQHWDU\ SROLF\ DQG LWV ¿QDQFLDO
market. The “Sovereign Money Initiative” 
aims at limiting money creation to Switzer-
land’s independent central bank, the Swiss 
1DWLRQDO%DQN,Q WKHFXUUHQW¿QDQFLDOV\V-
tem, not only central banks but private banks 
create money, in particular by granting loans, 
which, according to the committee promot-
ing said popular initiative, undermines the 
VWDELOLW\RI WKH¿QDQFLDOPDUNHWE\SURYRN-
ing “bank runs.” Further popular votes at the 
federal level are planned to be held on 23 
September and 25 November 2018. The Fed-
eral Council will determine, four months pri-
or to the respective polling days at the latest, 
which matters will be submitted to a vote.
V. FURTHER READING
Clive H. Church and Adrian Vatter, ‘Shad-
ows in the Swiss Paradise?’ (2017) 27 Jour-
nal of Democracy 166
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